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ADDRESSING CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
By
Ginger Snapp*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Brody K. Greenwald1 and Jennifer A. Ivers2 wrote Addressing Corruption Allegations in
International Arbitration to provide a comprehensive overview of the key corruption issues that
arise in international arbitration.3 The authors guide the reader through six chapters all of which
can be divided into three arcs representing issues that arise before, during, and after corruption
has been alleged. This review works though each individual chapter in detail. The first three
chapters make up the first arc and provide a well-written and insightful background as to what
corruption is, the requirements for establishing it, and the burdens and standards of proof that are
used in tribunal and court decisions.4 The fourth chapter starts the second arc and dives into the
role that corruption plays in real-life practice while citing to several major international cases
which have been affected by corruption.5 The last two chapters form the third arc and examine
the legal consequences and other issues that can arise after a case has been affected by
corruption.6
Although a very instructive piece of literature, this book falls apart at the seams halfway
through.7 Chapters one through four are relevant, organized, and informative, while chapters five
and six are extraneous, disorganized, and poorly written.8 Though the authors intend to organize
the book into chronological arcs, it instead naturally falls into two halves. 9 The split between the
* Ginger Snapp is the Editor-in-Chief of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2022 Juris Doctor Candidate at The
Pennsylvania State University School of Law.
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first and second half of the book is so readily apparent that it reads like two separate pieces of
work. It appears the authors either ran out of energy and time or did not collaborate when
deciding on structure, content, and citations. The second half of the book is repetitive, lacks any
coherent main points, and misses several significant arguments.10 Further, the citations in the
second half significantly falter both in the lack thereof and accuracy.11 While the opening part of
this book is a praiseworthy resource guide accessible to even lay readers, the latter portion is an
unorganized disarray of arbitrary facts.
II.

DESPITE LONGSTANDING EFFORTS TO COMBAT CORRUPTION, IT REMAINS ENDEMIC IN
MUCH OF THE WORLD

Chapter one begins the first arc of the book and sets the groundwork for the rest of the
chapters by providing an informative background about what corruption is and how it affects all
people.12 Any person could pick up this guide, read this chapter, and have a basic and wellinformed idea of corruption and its role in the modern world. The content of this chapter makes it
clear that allegations of corruption will likely continue as a crucial issue for international
arbitration disputes despite preventative practices.13
The book defines corruption as “the misuse of a public or private position for direct or
indirect personal gain.”14 Additionally, corruption encompasses crimes such as bribery, insider
dealing, influence-peddling, abuse of power, nepotism, revolving doors between the private and
public sectors, and conflicts of interest.15 Corruption undermines democracy and the rule of law,
leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life for all people, and
allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish.16
In 1977, the United States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), and
became the first country to enact major legislation prohibiting the bribery of foreign public
officials.17 In 1996, the member States of the Organization of American States, minus Cuba,
followed suit and enacted the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.18 Since the passage
of these pioneer prohibitions, nearly every state across the globe has ratified one or more similar
international anticorruption conventions.19 Further, most, if not all, countries have criminalized
10
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corruption because it is contrary to international public policy.20
Despite the substantial efforts of many states and international organizations to stamp out
corruption, bribes are still routinely demanded and paid.21 In 2017, Transparency International
reported that nearly one in four people stated that they had paid a bribe within the past year.22
Similarly, the World Bank found that businesses and individuals pay more than US $1 trillion
combined in bribes every year.23
After the author explains the factual background as presented above, the remainder of this
chapter and the subsequent chapters begin to shift their focus from corruption in general to
bribery alone. Bribery is only one of the seven types of corruption explicitly mentioned in this
chapter, yet it becomes the sole focus for the rest of the book, while the other above-mentioned
types of corruption are never again discussed.24 The authors treat the terms “corruption” and
“bribery” as synonyms; however, the two words have different meanings. According to Black’s
Law Dictionary, bribery is “the corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for
official action” while corruption is “an impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle.”25
If the authors intended to write a book on bribery, the title and chapter headings should
have indicated so instead of misleading readers. A more comprehensive guide to corruption
would have included examples and definitions of all the types of corruption, instead of focusing
exclusively on bribery. One reason the authors may have chosen to direct their focus towards
bribery is because it is the most prevalent form of corruption in international arbitration.26
However, this distinction was not made and subsequently, the reader is misled.
III.

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING CORRUPTION

While chapter two is an instructive and well-structured portion of an overall useful book,
it seems to have missed the mark at accomplishing what its title claims to accomplish. The
authors not only disregard all other types of corruption, they further narrow their scope by
focusing only on the tip of the corruption iceberg, missing out on the opportunity to delve into
the root cause of corruption, which is the virtually unlimited discretion that the arbitrator
retains.27 Chapter two is supposed to describe the requirements to establish corruption, but it
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instead repeats the issue referenced in the last chapter, and explains the requirements to establish
bribery.28
The chapter begins by diving right into the mandatory elements of corruption. According
to arbitral tribunals considering similar definitions of corruption, there are three requirements to
establish corruption: (i) the promise, offer, or giving of something of value; (ii) intended for a
public official or another person or entity; (iii) in order for that official to take or refrain from
taking official action.29 Because of the three-fold requirement, corruption is notoriously difficult
to establish. Further, there is typically little or no physical evidence because the parties involved
use evasive means to ensure no trail of their wrongdoing, making corruption even more difficult
to prove.30
After the authors give a general explanation of how to establish what they claim to be
corruption, but what is in actuality bribery, they then go on to state several noteworthy
observations. Firstly, a bribe does not need to be cash or some tangible form, it may be anything
of value.31 Next, a crime is committed upon the offer or promise to give a bribe regardless of
when or whether a payment is ever made.32 Also, bribes may be negotiated and paid indirectly,
meaning that the person offering the bribe does not need to know the identity of the ultimate
beneficiary.33 Similarly, it is unlawful to offer or give a bribe to a public official even if he or she
is not in a position of power or authority to accept the specific bribe at issue.34 However, other
courts and tribunals have dismissed allegations of bribery when a so-called public official did not
actually have the authority by law to take or refrain from taking the bribe in question.35
Furthermore, the foreign public official does not need to benefit directly from the bribe so long
as the beneficiary is “another person or entity.”36 Lastly, bribery has an element of criminal
intent, or mens rea, because bribery must be committed intentionally, willfully, knowingly with a
“bad purpose,” or with a conscious disregard.37
An additional noteworthy observation that the authors failed to include is what breeds
Inna Uchkunova, Arbitral, Not Arbitrary – Part I: Limits to Arbitral Discretion in ICSID Arbitration, KLUWER
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corruption, which is the amount of discretion that an arbitrator retains.38 Because arbitrators have
nearly unlimited discretion with regards to case outcomes, parties are likely to bribe or engage in
other corrupt practices in order to receive a favorable outcome.39 Exact definitions of arbitrator
discretion are rare, so as not to limit the arbitrator’s powers.40 Further, an arbitrator’s decision is
final and legally binding, granting the arbitrator nearly absolute power over the parties.41 Though
the explanations and descriptions summarized above are straight-forward and accurate, the scope
is far too narrow. The authors focus solely on bribery when there is a plethora of other forms of
corruption and even more importantly, key points like the root cause of corruption, that need to
be pursued.
IV.

THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF FOR ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION

In contrast to the earlier, more organized and more accessible chapters, the reader must
read much more carefully to dissect chapter three. The reason this chapter is so difficult to sort
through is because the authors provided an excessive number of confusingly worded
subheadings.42 Unfortunately, the subheadings, which should be aimed at making the chapter
easier to follow, actually make it even more difficult to understand. Additionally, this chapter
was one of the longest chapters within the book for no apparent reason other than to emphasize
the importance of burdens and standards of proof in arbitration.43
Like the previous two chapters, chapter three also begins with a set of definitions to
provide some background for the reader. The burden of proof is defined as “the legal burden
borne by the party that must persuade the tribunal in order to prevail on its entire case or a
particular issue.”44 The standard of proof is defined as “the amount of evidence needed to
establish either an individual issue or the party’s case as a whole.”45
The burden of proof lies with the party alleging the corruption, whether it is the claimant
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or the respondent.46 The opposing party has no legal burden to disprove the allegation.47 Several
tribunals have ruled that if a party adduces some evidence which supports their allegation of
corruption, the burden of proof now shifts to the opponent.48 While some courts support a
shifting burden in corruption cases, other courts, and the authors of this book, are firmly against
it.49
The authors describe a shifting burden as problematic for several reasons. First,
arbitration is neither an interrogative system where the court establishes the facts, nor a system
where the case relies on one party to rebut another party’s argument.50 Second, there are serious
due process concerns with requiring the accused party to prove it did nothing wrong, because this
is incompatible with the right to a fair trial.51 Due process means that each party is entitled to fair
treatment.52 A shifting burden completely undermines fair treatment because it changes the
judicial process, and its rules as a whole, by moving the burden from the party best able to carry
it to the party not equally equipped.53 Requiring a party to prove the absence of corruption would
be proving a negative, which is logically impossible.54 Third, the burden of proof is a persuasive
burden that requires the party bearing the burden to prove their particular issue, or lose on the
issue in question.55 This means that if the party successfully proves corruption, then they have
won the issue and shifting the burden uproots the persuasive burden requirement of arbitration
tribunals.56
After the burden of proof has been thoroughly discussed, the authors move on to the
standard of proof as used in investment arbitral proceedings. As similarly stated above, the
standard of proof is the level of proof needed in a case, which is established by assessing all
evidence.57 Courts and tribunals differ as to the applicable standard of proof, although the
majority require more compelling evidence to prove corruption.58
46
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There are five different standards of proof applied by national courts. First, in civil law
countries, the judge is the trier of fact and is not bound by any strict standards, and therefore is
free to decide matters based on “inner conviction.”59 Second, in common law countries, the
standard of proof in civil proceedings is usually “preponderance of the evidence,” which requires
proof that the facts alleged are more likely true than not.60 Also, in countries based on a common
law system, the standard of proof in criminal proceedings is the much higher standard of
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” which requires proof coming as close to certainty as is humanly
possible.61 The United States further recognizes the “clear and convincing evidence” standard of
proof that is higher than “preponderance of the evidence” but lower than “beyond a reasonable
doubt.”62 The “clear and convincing evidence” standard requires proof that the facts alleged are
not merely probable but are in fact highly probable so as to establish a firm belief or conviction
that the allegations in question are true.63 This standard is used where the individual interests at
stake are more consequential than the loss of money, or in cases alleging serious illegality such
as fraud, undue influence, and corruption.64 Lastly, England and Australia apply the “balance of
probabilities” or the “more probable than not” standard of proof in all civil proceedings,
regardless of the subject matter at dispute.65 This standard is used because the more improbable
the event, the stronger the evidence should be.66 Despite using different labels for the standard of
proof, the U.S., England, and Australia all require more compelling evidence to establish civil
claims based on allegations of corruption or fraud.67
On the other hand, international courts and tribunals typically do not impose any strict
standard of proof.68 The leading arbitral rules contain substantially identical provisions granting
broad discretion to tribunals to resolve evidentiary issues.69 Eleven uncited examples are
provided to show that the majority rule is that “the Arbitral Tribunal shall determine the
admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of evidence.”70 In the absence of a precise rule
establishing the standard of proof, tribunals in commercial arbitrations determine the standard
59
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based on the applicable law, occasionally issuing conflicting decisions on an issue.71 The choice
of law depends on the tribunal’s determination as to whether the standard of proof is a procedural
issue, a substantive issue, or subject to some international standard.72 Therefore, arbitrators and
tribunals are entrusted with a great deal of discretion over how the relevant facts are to be found
and to be proved.73
Moreover, for allegations of particular gravity, such as fraud, corruption, or other serious
illegality, most international courts and tribunals have applied a higher standard of proof.74 The
authors provide concrete examples of when international courts and tribunals have used three
different higher standards of proof. The first higher standard of proof is the standard of
“convinced of comfortable satisfaction.”75 The second higher standard is the American standard
of “clear and convincing evidence.”76 And the third higher standard is when there is “no room
for reasonable doubt.”77
However, a minority of courts take a slightly different approach where the seriousness of
the allegation does not necessarily mean that the tribunal must apply a heightened standard of
proof.78 Although some tribunals follow this approach of applying the ordinary standard of
preponderance of the evidence, their observations are still consistent with the majority view that
a more rigorous assessment and more compelling evidence are required to find fraud and
corruption.79 Therefore, in most cases, tribunals will either impose a higher standard of proof or
will exercise great care and require more compelling evidence to prove allegations of corruption
and fraud.80
Additionally, in cases where direct evidence of a fact is not available, numerous tribunals
have held that corruption nevertheless may be proven through circumstantial evidence.81 Such
circumstantial evidence must establish the specific facts alleged, and the mere existence of
suspicion cannot be equated with proof.82 While corruption may be proven through
71

Greenwald, supra note 2, at 25.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 26.

75

Id. at 27.

76

Greenwald, supra note 2, at 27.

77

Id. at 28.

78

Id. at 30 (referencing cases like Rompetrol v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, (May 6, 2013); ECE
Projektmanagement v. Czech Republic, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013); Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/18 (July 26, 2007) and; Union Fenosa v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/4 (Aug. 31, 2018.).
79

Id. at 30.

80

Id. at 31.

81

Greenwald, supra note 2, at 15, 31.

82

Id. at 33.

230

circumstantial evidence by “connecting the dots,” it is not sufficient to allege generally that an
entire government or judiciary is corrupt, or that a person or entity acted corruptly in another
context.83
Furthermore, many domestic arbitration acts now authorize courts and tribunals to draw
adverse inferences against either party for failing to produce evidence if that party has
possession, custody, or control of the evidence and was ordered to produce it.84 An adverse
inference is a legal inference, adverse to the concerned party, made from a party's silence or the
absence of requested evidence.85 One of the most effective sanctions to deter a party from
concealing evidence is the threat to draw an adverse inference.86
Despite starting out as an easy to read book, this chapter takes for granted the lay readers
in the audience and stops defining legal jargon, leaving it to the readers to do their own outside
research. Although a difficult chapter to read due to structural organization, this chapter mainly
provides definitions of basic legal concepts with little to no room for oppositional comments.
V.

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: PROVING CORRUPTION IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

Unlike the previous chapters which provided basic background definitions and
information regarding corruption, chapter four starts the second arc of the book and examines
several current arbitration cases affected by corruption. Parties have succeeded in proving
corruption in only a few investment arbitrations.87 This chapter uses the background provided in
the previous three chapters to examine real world examples of corruption. The three cases
highlighted are World Duty Free v. Kenya,88 Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan,89 and Chevron v.
Ecuador.90 The authors chose to describe these cases in an unclear manner and excruciating
detail. Only after several read-throughs was it possible for even a practiced reader to understand
the lengthy run-on sentences and uncover the gist of each case.
The first and most infamous case is World Duty Free v. Kenya.91 The World Duty Free
case was an arbitration proceeding that arose under a contract to build, maintain, and operate
83
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duty-free complexes at airports in Kenya.92 World Duty Free’s Chairman admitted to paying a
“personal donation” to the President of Kenya as part of the “consideration” to obtain the
contract.93 The tribunal concluded that the Chairman’s payment was a bribe to obtain the
contract with Kenya because the transfer of money was covert, with the intention that it remain
confidential, and an intrinsic part of the overall transaction, without which no contract would
have been executed between the parties.94
The next case mentioned in the book is Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan.95 Metal-Tech had
obtained Uzbekistan’s approval to establish a joint venture with two State-owned entities.96 At
the hearing, Metal-Tech’s chairman and CEO testified that Metal-Tech had paid approximately
US $4,000,000 to three alleged consultants who included the brother of the Prime Minister of
Uzbekistan and a former government official.97 The tribunal concluded that Metal-Tech’s
payments made to the consultants raised several “red flags” of corruption.98 The biggest red flag
raised was that Metal-Tech could provide no evidence of the consultant’s services, because there
were no legitimate services at the time of the investment.99
The Metal-Tech tribunal created a rule beneficial for future arbitration tribunals to use by
identifying a number of “red flags” of corruption that, while not conclusive, are indeed warning
signs that need to be taken seriously and investigated.100 Common red flags of corruption
include, among other things, when a consultant or other intermediary: (i) has a close personal,
familial, or professional relationship with a key government decision-maker; (ii) shows up
shortly before government action is to be taken; (iii) claims to know the right people to obtain
the desired government action; (iv) lacks experience in the particular sector; (v) requires urgent
or unusually high payments or commissions; (vi) requests to be paid in cash or through a third
person or entity; (vii) provides unspecified services; and (viii) does not reside or have a
significant business presence in the country where the project is located.101 These red flags
would have been valuable if they were described earlier in the book, when the other requirements
for corruption were explained, but the authors likely included it here to emphasize the relevance
of the case.
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The last and most recent case is Chevron v. Ecuador.102 Chevron concerned a judgement
by one of Ecuador’s courts, which had ordered Chevron to pay US $18,200,000,000 in
damages.103 The tribunal in this case relied solely on circumstantial evidence and, based on the
totality of the circumstances, concluded that the plaintiffs’ representatives had corruptly
ghostwritten at least material parts of the court’s prior judgement by promising bribes to the
judge.104
These three examples show that most of the investment arbitration cases where
corruption was proven were based on damning admissions made by the party found to have paid
the bribes.105 So while rare, several investment arbitration proceedings have successfully
established the existence of arbitral corruption.106 Though other similar cases were mentioned
throughout this chapter, their presence only distracted the reader from the main points drawn
from the three important cases. Despite the aforementioned surplus of corruption plaguing
international investment arbitration, only three of these cases have proven corruption, furthering
the author’s strong conclusion that corruption is very difficult to prove.107
VI.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

Chapter five starts the third arc of the book by moving the topics of discussion from
events that occur during and before a corrupt act has occurred, to events that occur after that
corruption has been recognized. Although this portion of the book discusses additional issues
caused by corruption, it once again misleads the readers and misses some crucial points by
failing to touch on the actual consequences that someone might face if they are found guilty of
corrupt practices.108 The authors focus mostly on consequences of corruption on the arbitration
process as a whole, not the individuals guilty of corrupt practices.109 Further, much of this
chapter is incoherent and the important information is not readily available. On top of that, the
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chapter lacks effective citations.110 As a whole, this chapter is the least well-written portion of
the entire book.
Chapter five begins by reemphasizing the seriousness of corruption in arbitration.111
Corruption of a state officer or arbitrator by bribery or any other form of corruption is
synonymous with the most heinous crimes because it can cause massive economic damage.112
Therefore, if an arbitrator, party, or state official is found guilty of corruption, the consequences
are likely to be severe.113 After the authors stress the harmfulness of arbitral corruption, they
present four consequences of corruption.114 However, these consequences are not concrete
punishments for wrongdoing, as one might expect when they think of the word “consequence.”
Instead, the consequences presented by the authors are actually consequent concerns or issues
that corruption itself may cause or create.
The first consequence underscored in this chapter describes the supplementary costs that
befall a state if they violate the obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment by retaliating
against and causing damage to an investor for corrupt reasons.115 A number of claimants in
investment arbitration have alleged that state officials solicited bribes then retaliated against
investors for failing to comply with the demand.116 One such case that the authors mention to
drive home this point is the previously cited case of Chevron.117 After it was decided that corrupt
practices were used in Chevron, the judgment of the case was immediately annulled.118 The State
was required to return any proceeds gained, and other corrective measures were implemented to
re-establish the situation which would have existed if those internationally wrongful acts had not
been committed. 119 Although not explained by the authors, independent research reveals that
similar to the tribunal in Chevron, other courts have held that if an arbitrator or public official
acting on behalf of the State is found guilty of accepting a bribe, he or she may face a
suspension, civil and criminal fines, imprisonment, injunctions, forfeiture of assets, and/or
disgorgement of profits.120
The second consequence discussed by the authors is that in both commercial and
110
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investment arbitrations, tribunals have consistently held that contracts to pay bribes are void, and
that contracts procured through corruption are, at a minimum, voidable121 because they do not
give rise to valid claims.122 This section cites back to World Duty Free v. Kenya to make the
point that when a contract formed based off of a bribe is annulled, any and all awards must be set
aside, and both parties are ordered to bear their own costs of arbitration.123
The third consequence emphasized is that investments made through corruption would
not be protected under any treaty.124 To strengthen this idea, the authors point back to MetalTech v. Uzbekistan. Many investment treaties, including the one in Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan,
contain clauses providing that the investor must invest in compliance with international law in
order to benefit from the treaty’s protections.125 Otherwise, the tribunal may refuse jurisdiction
because there is a lack of consent to arbitrate.126 The authors are seemingly trying to make the
argument that corrupt investments are inherently invalid. They have chosen only to describe
obvious effects of corruption on the arbitral process instead of researching concrete civil and
criminal punishments that a party or arbitrator may face if they are found guilty of certain corrupt
behaviors.127
The fourth and final consequence stressed by the authors is that “post-investment
corruption, fraud, or illegality may have consequences for the merits of the claims, or the amount
of compensation awarded but will not result in a lack of jurisdiction or in the admissibility of the
claims.”128 There is little to no explanation of what the authors meant by this statement and
virtually no clarification on what “future claims” the authors may be referencing. Moreover, the
authors do not create a new consequence of corruption but reiterate the previous points made.129
This section would have been another ideal location for the authors to discuss personal and
individual consequences of international corruption but instead they again focus only on how the
arbitration as a whole is affected by corruption.
Although this chapter found a roundabout way to describe some consequences associated
with the heinous crimes of corruption, it missed the mark by taking a narrow, indirect pathway.
The authors chose to point their focus towards problems caused by corruption. But the actual
tangible penalties that one might face from partaking in corrupt practices are missing from this
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analysis in the book.130 Throughout the book, and this chapter especially, the authors harp on the
dangerous and rampant ways of corruption yet the actual consequences and standard
punishments for these grave crimes are vaguely described.131
VII.

OBJECTIONS BASED ON ATTRIBUTION AND ESTOPPEL WHERE THE STATE DOES NOT
PROSECUTE THE ALLEGED CORRUPTION

The final chapter falls prey to the same confusing headings, rambling sentences, and
immaterial substance matter as the previous two chapters. 132 The preceding chapter delves into
the consequences when a party is guilty of corruption.133 The apparent aim of chapter six is to
describe the consequences when the state, another party, or the arbitrator is aware of corruption
but does not report it. While this is an important subject to touch on, it could have been included
in the previous chapter as an additional consequence. It is unclear why this specific issue is
important enough that the authors chose to create an entirely separate chapter to focus on it.
Furthermore, the authors fail to explain what happens to an arbitrator or party when they fail to
report corruption.
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, arbitrators, the state, and parties can all be
guilty of corrupt practices.134 Despite this fact, the non-state associated parties seem to face the
greatest punishments while the state officials and arbitrators get off with only minor
reprimands.135 Many people find issue with this discrepancy, resulting in a push by arbitral
institutions for government officials and arbitrators to be more severely punished for their
wrongful conduct.136 The push for equal punishments among arbitral parties is backed by issues
of attribution and estoppel.137
With regard to attribution, bribery is a bilateral act that by its very nature involves the
participation of both the parties, state or non-state, and the arbitrator.138 Next, a state or arbitrator
should be estopped from raising corruption as a defense to any post-arbitration issues if it failed
to prosecute the alleged wrongdoers in its domestic courts.139 A state or arbitrator’s failure to
report on corruption could permit inferring that they were just as knowledgeable and guilty as the
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other corrupt parties involved.140 However, no tribunal in an investment arbitration has prevented
a party from raising a corruption defense due to its failure to bring criminal charges in domestic
courts.141 Although a party’s failure to prosecute will not preclude it from raising a corruption
defense in arbitration, the tribunal may consider it when assessing the evidence of the alleged
corruption and when awarding costs.142
Despite arbitration institutions’ push for equal punishments between parties to arbitration,
some arbitration experts still hold steadfast to the leniency of punishments for arbitrators and
government parties.143 While harsher consequences for the investors may seem unfair, their
payment of bribes violates both host state law and international public policy.144 Such investors
have thus forfeited their right to seek justice before courts and tribunals and have no basis to
complain about the consequences of their illicit activities.145
The authors end the sixth and final chapter before taking the opportunity to delve deeper
into the actual punishments or penalties that a state official or arbitrator may face if they fail to
report corrupt practices. Outside research reveals that if and when an arbitrator fails to address
known corruption, most arbitral rules allow a party to move to remove an arbitrator for
impropriety.146Although there are systems that may help a party deal with an immediate instance
of corruption, there are no long lasting or perfect plans in place to discourage corruption in the
system overall.147 A potential solution that has been discussed amongst arbitration scholars is
modification of the arbitral rules to allow for challenges against arbitrators specifically on
corruption grounds, and requiring arbitrators to base their decisions on objective fact, rather than
their subjective view.148
Throughout the final chapter, the authors make a valiant attempt to address the
inconsistency between consequences faced by parties but ultimately fall short of drawing any
solid conclusions. The reader is required to do outside research to determine what consequences,
if any, an arbitrator may face for failing to report corrupt practices. Additionally, this portion of
the book would be an excellent place for the expert authors to input their opinions on how to
solve the issue of corruption in investment arbitration, but this route was unfortunately not taken.
Lastly, the format, structure, and citations used throughout chapter six were entirely different and
faltered in comparison to the earlier chapters, which set high expectations for the reader.149
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

This resource guide makes a noble attempt to deliver the main point that corruption
allegations are now routinely raised in international proceedings for good reason.150 The first
chapter highlights that despite widespread attempts, corruption still plagues the international
courts, even though it improperly equates corruption with bribery.151 The second chapter
explains that the requirements for establishing bribery are specific and straight-forward but still
hard to prove, and while accurate, the authors create too narrow a scope by limiting their
complaints to bribery only and excluding other forms of corruption. Further, this chapter would
create a strong opportunity to stress the relevance of arbitrator discretion and its role in breeding
other forms of corruption, like bribery.152 The third chapter discusses the burden and standards of
proof for corruption, which are generally high and on the alleging party. While this chapter is
one of the strongest chapters substantively, lacking virtually any holes, it loses its readers
through its unnecessarily lengthy descriptions and excessive and confusing subheadings.153 The
fourth chapter provides insight into how corruption is rampant, now more than ever, through
concrete case examples.154 The fifth chapter delves into the consequences faced by the
arbitrators, parties and/or governmental officials found guilty of corruption. This chapter,
probably the hardest to decipher, hits on some important post-corruption effects while leaving
out the major penalties that parties actually face for partaking in corrupt practices.155 The sixth
chapter delves into a supplementary consequence faced by arbitrators or parties that do not report
on known corruption. The authors seemed to miss out on an opportunity to explain the role of the
arbitrator and how he or she may be responsible for preventing or reporting corruption.156 All in
all, the authors tried diligently to provide an insightful and educational resource guide of
corruption in arbitration. If the authors would have been more coherent and consistent in their
structural preferences and substantive factual patterns, this book could have been nearly perfect.
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